Under favorable but reasonable conditions, an imperfectly enforced emissions tax produces the efficient allocation of individual emissions control; aggregate emissions are independent of whether enforcement of the tax is sufficient to induce the full compliance of firms, and differences in individual violations are independent of firm-level differences. All of these desirable characteristics disappear when some firms under an emissions tax risk bankruptcy-the allocation of emissions control is inefficient, imperfect enforcement causes higher aggregate emissions, and financially insecure firms choose higher violations. 
Introduction
The most important reason for implementing an emissions tax to control pollution is that whatever level of aggregate emissions control is achieved with the tax, the distribution of emissions control among pollution sources will minimize their aggregate costs of achieving that level of control. Moreover, under reasonable conditions the allocative efficiency of an emissions tax holds even when enforcement is imperfect in the sense that it is not stringent enough to keep firms from evading some portion of their tax liabilities. The reason for the allocative efficiency of an imperfectly enforced emissions tax is that firms choose their emissions to equate the tax to their marginal emissions control costs whether they are compliant or not (Harford 1978 and 1987; Sandmo 2002) .
1 Consequently, their emission choices are independent of their compliance decisions, and aggregate emissions are independent of whether enforcement of a tax induces full 1 Malik (1990) and Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) find the same result in the context of competitive emissions trading. Murphy and Stranlund (2006) find some support for this hypothesis in laboratory emissions trading experiments.
or partial compliance. Thus, the environmental outcome of an emissions tax does not depend on it being perfectly enforced. 2 Of course, firms' levels of tax evasion depend on the stringency of enforcement strategy they face. However, their violation choices are independent of their exogenous characteristics like production and abatement technologies, and input and output choices. This is important because it frees regulators from having to gather hard-to-obtain firmlevel information to target their monitoring effort. 3 Moreover, it implies that the costs of sanctioning firms are independent of this information.
In this paper we examine the performance of an emissions tax when some sources of pollution risk bankruptcy and the tax is imperfectly enforced. With the continuing application of price-based environmental policies, it is certain that regulators will confront, or have already confronted, control situations that are difficult to enforce and that involve financially distressed firms. Emissions taxes, in particular, impose a heavier financial burden on regulated firms than other control policies like emissions trading schemes or emissions standards. Thus, knowledge of how the financial health of regulated firms can impact the performance of an imperfectly enforced emissions tax is an important consideration in the design and evaluation of these policies.
We demonstrate that the desirable characteristics of an imperfectly enforced emissions tax disappear when some regulated firms face the risk of bankruptcy. In this case an emissions tax will fail to allocate individual emissions control efficiently. Thus, the main reason for implementing emissions taxes does not hold when some pollution sources are financially insecure. Moreover, firms that risk bankruptcy choose higher emissions when they are noncompliant than when they are compliant. Consequently, imperfect enforcement has negative environmental consequences when some firms risk insolvency that is not present when all firms are financially secure. Finally, financially insecure firms choose higher violations than financially secure firms. Thus, the financial health of firms is an important element in the allocation of scarce enforcement resources among firms. The key factor that produces these negative results is the well-known limited liability effect of debt financing-financially insecure firms ignore returns in bankrupt states because debt holders become the residual claimants. Thus, they make their decisions by optimizing only over states in which they are solvent, which distorts their choices away from those they would make if they were financially secure (Brander and Lewis 1986 ).
We are not the first to demonstrate that the financial health of firms and limited liability can impact the performance of regulatory designs, including environmental policies. Spiegel and Spulber (1994) investigate the interactions between the investment and financial decisions of firms and a regulator's control of their output price. Damania (2000) explores the link between pollution taxes and the financial and output decisions of firms in an oligopolistic industry, but he does not allow firms to be noncompliant. Similarly, we have noted that bankruptcy risk and the limited liability effect can undermine the efficiency of competitive emissions trading in Stranlund and Zhang (2008) , but we did so under the assumption that firms are perfectly compliant. Damania and Bulte (2005) relate the harvest decisions of firms in a fishery to their financial structure and imperfectly enforced regulatory controls, but they focus on fixed harvest quotas. Thus, to our knowledge we are the first to examine how the combined roles of bankruptcy risk and imperfect enforcement affect the performance of emissions taxes. 
A Model of an Indebted Firm under an Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Tax
Throughout we consider an industry composed of heterogeneous, risk neutral firms whose emissions are controlled by a uniform emissions tax. Enforcement of the tax is imperfect in the sense that it is not sufficient to keep firms from attempting to evade a portion of their tax liabilities. Assume that each firm is controlled by shareholders, so the manager of each firm seeks to maximize the expected value of the firm.
For a particular firm in the industry, given its optimal choices of inputs and outputs, the gross profit of the firm (profit excluding its tax and penalty payments) is ( , )(1 ) e z π β + , where is the firm's emissions, e β is an exogenous factor that affects the firm's gross profit, and is a continuous random variable that is independently, but not necessarily identically distributed among the firms in the industry. Each firm's gross profit function is strictly increasing and strictly concave in the firm's emissions. The random variable captures the effects of uncertainty on the firm's gross profit, such as the effects of random shifts in the demand for its output or in factor prices. The probability density function of is with support
expectation of is zero so that the firm's expected gross profit is simply z ( , ) e π β . The value of is revealed only after the firm has made its emissions and compliance decisions. z Each firm's reported emissions, , are taxed at rate t . To check whether the firms report their true emission, each of them is audited with a constant probability r α that is common knowledge between the regulator and the firm. An audit reveals a firm's actual emissions without errors. A firm is in violation if its actual emissions exceed its reported emissions. Since we are concerned with the combined roles of financial insecurity and noncompliance in this paper, we limit our analysis to situations in which firms' violations are positive. If an audit reveals that a firm is in violation, a penalty ) ( r e f − is imposed. The penalty function is the same for all firms, and it is positive, strictly increasing, and strictly convex for positive violations.
Like Brander and Lewis (1986) , Damania (2000) , Damania and Bulte (2005) , and Stranlund and Zhang (2008), we focus the analysis on a single period in which the financial structure of the firm is fixed. A firm's financial structure is summarized by two variables; one is the firm's equity , and the other is the firm's debt obligation . The firm reimburses creditors from net profits. If the firm's losses exceed its equity, it will declare bankruptcy, shut down, and use its equity to partially pay off its debt. Apart from losing its equity, there are no other costs associated with declaring bankruptcy.
A D
Given a realization of , the payoff to the shareholders of the firm is z
if it is audited by the regulator, and the payoff is The breakeven value of when the firm is not audited is denoted , which is determined by setting [2] equal to zero and solving for :
Note that when the firm is noncompliant (i.e., and the firm will definitely go bankrupt. In this case it will not even bother to begin production. Despite this possibility, and the possibility that a firm will certainly be insolvent if it is audited but may not be if it is not audited, we simplify our analysis by assuming that the probabilities the firm is solvent are strictly greater than zero. This requires na a z z ≤ < z .
We are now ready to specify the decision problem of the manager of a firm. Recall that a manager is risk neutral and chooses his or her firm's emissions and emissions report to maximize the expected value of the firm. Assuming that the manager chooses positive emissions, emissions report, and violation, his or her decision problem is to choose and to maximize 0 The firm's expected value function consists of two parts; the firm's expected value given that it is audited multiplied by the probability of an audit (the top line of V ) plus the expected value of the firm given that it is not audited times the probability that it is not audited (the bottom line of V ). Equity holders of the firm earn a return when the firm does not go bankrupt, but are left empty-handed when the firm is insolvent. Thus, shareholder-controlled financially insecure firms ignore states of bankruptcy when making decisions, because the payoff in these states is zero. This is why the value function V does not include terms for a z z < and . This is the essence of the limited liability effect, which has important consequences for the choices of a firm that operates under an emissions tax.
na z z <
To determine these choices we assume throughout that V is strictly concave in and .
The following first-order conditions are then both necessary and sufficient to identify a firm's optimal emissions and emissions report: 
Now combine equations [6] and
Our analysis of the effects of bankruptcy risk on imperfectly enforced emissions taxes is based on equations [7] and [8].
Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes When Firms Are Financially Secure
In this section we use our model to review some fundamental conclusions about imperfectly enforced emissions taxes when firms do not risk bankruptcy. There are no new results in this section-some have been shown directly by Harford (1978 and 1987) and Sandmo (2002) , in particular, while others can be gleaned from the works of Malik (1990) and Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) who focused on emissions trading. These results have to do with the allocative efficiency of an imperfectly enforced tax, that individual and aggregate emissions do not depend on whether a tax is enforced to achieve full compliance, and the independence of violations on firm-level characteristics. We present all of the results in a single proposition. Like all the proofs of this paper we have relegated the proof of Proposition 1 to the appendix.
Proposition 1:
If no firm that operates under an emissions tax risks bankruptcy, then:
(1) The allocation of individual emissions control is efficient despite imperfect enforcement.
(2) Each firm's choice of emissions is independent of their compliance decision.
(3) Aggregate emissions are unaffected by imperfect enforcement.
(4) Individual firms' violations are independent of its exogenous characteristics.
The key to these results is that a noncompliant financially secure firm keys its emissions and violation decisions directly to the emissions tax by satisfying the three-way equality, Before we move to examining how these results change when at least some firms in an industry risk bankruptcy, it is worthwhile to be clear about how the results depend on two assumptions we maintain throughout this paper. The first is that each firm submits a positive emissions report. It is straightforward to show that a financially secure firm that reports zero emissions chooses its actual emissions so that ( , ).
e t e π β ≥ If this inequality is strict for some firms, then the expected marginal gross profits of the firms will not be equalized and aggregate expected gross profits will not be maximized. The possibility that a tax regulation will be so poorly enforced that some firms report zero emissions seems rather remote. One may also wonder whether a real firm would ever reports zero emissions, given that this would send such an obvious signal of noncompliance to the regulator.
The other assumption that is necessary for Proposition 1 is that the probability a firm will be monitored does not depend on its emissions or emissions report. Actually, all that is needed for Proposition 1 to hold is that firms are not monitored with probability ( , ) e r α such that e r α α ≠ − (Harford 1978 and 1987 , Sandmo 2002 ). Under such a monitoring probability firms will choose their emissions so that their expected marginal gross profits differ from the tax. This will cause expected aggregate gross profit to be less than maximum. For this reason, we do not examine such a monitoring strategy in this paper.
Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes When Firms Are Financially Insecure
In this section we demonstrate how the results in Proposition 1 are modified in the presence of financially insecure firms. We begin with the allocative efficiency of an emission tax when some firms in an industry risk bankruptcy.
Proposition 2: If some firms under an emissions tax risk bankruptcy the distribution of individual emissions control will not be efficient.
The allocative inefficiency of an emissions tax when some firms in an industry risk bankruptcy is due to the fact that these firms will choose emissions so that their expected marginal gross profits are less than the tax ( ) expected marginal gross profits be equal. Not only will the expected marginal gross profits of firms that risk bankruptcy differ from those of firms that are financially secure, expected marginal gross profits among financially distressed firms will likely differ because the values of and vary among these firms, and the densities may vary as well. Since the emissions tax will not equate the firms' expected marginal gross profits, expected industry gross profit will not be maximized. Thus, the main reason for implementing emissions taxes does not hold in situations involving financially insecure firms.
The result that firms that risk bankruptcy choose their emissions so that their expected marginal gross profits are less than the tax implies that they choose higher emissions than if they were financially secure. This is due to the limited liability effect-since firms that risk bankruptcy do not consider bankrupt states in their decisions they optimize over only those states in which they will be solvent. Optimization over this restricted range of the random variable causes them to choose higher emissions. z It is important to note that this result of allocative inefficiency holds whether financially insecure firms are also noncompliant or not. In fact, we have noted this result in a model of a perfectly enforced emissions trading scheme (Stranlund and Zhang 2008) . With the next proposition we show that imperfect enforcement causes financially insecure firms to choose even higher levels of emissions.
Proposition 3: A firm that risks bankruptcy will choose higher emissions if an emissions tax is imperfectly enforced than if it is perfectly enforced.
Proposition 4 follows directly from Proposition 3.
Proposition 4: Imperfect enforcement of an emissions tax leads to higher aggregate emissions when some firms under the tax risk bankruptcy.
Recall from Proposition 1 that, under reasonable circumstances, imperfect enforcement has no effect on the emissions of financially secure firms. Thus, a regulator does not need to be concerned about the environmental impacts of imperfect enforcement. However, Proposition 4 reveals that this result does not hold when an emissions tax is applied to firms that risk insolvency-imperfect enforcement weakens the ability of an emissions tax to improve environmental outcomes when it is applied in a situation involving financially insecure firms.
Bankruptcy risk and imperfect enforcement also makes the allocation of enforcement effort more complicated. Part (4) of Proposition 1 reveals that differences in the violations of financially secure firms are independent of differences in their exogenous characteristics. Thus, a regulator does not need to gather information about individual firms to target its enforcement effort-only the tax and the enforcement parameters, all of which are known by the regulator, determine a firm's violations. This is no longer true when some firms risk insolvency. In particular, the violations of financially insecure firms will differ from the violations of financially secure firms.
Proposition 5: Noncompliant firms that risk bankruptcy choose higher violations than if they were financially secure.
Armed with Proposition 5, a regulator who is motivated to use its scarce enforcement resources to detect and punish firms that tend toward higher violations may wish to target its enforcement effort at financially insecure firms. Doing so, of course, requires the regulator to gather information on the financial health of all firms. At best, gathering this information will add to the cost of enforcing an emissions tax. Moreover, the higher aggregate violations that are produced by bankruptcy risk and imperfect enforcement may lead to higher costs of sanctioning noncompliant firms. Thus, bankruptcy risk places more pressure on scarce enforcement resources.
Note that we have not addressed the point of part (4) of Proposition 1 directly. There we showed the independence of parametric differences in firms' profit functions on differences in their violations. Proposition 5 focuses on the role that differences in the financial health of firms have on differences in their violations. The comparative static relating a parametric change in a financially insecure firm's profit to its violation choice is a very complicated function that has an indeterminate sign. (The derivation of this comparative static is available upon request). Thus, the violations of firms that risk bankruptcy are not, in general, independent of parametric differences in their gross profit functions; in fact, a parametric increase in a firm's profit function can cause it to choose higher or lower violations. Moreover, the comparative static depends on all the parameters of the firm's decision problem, including those involving the enforcement strategy it faces, its financial structure, and the uncertainty about its profit. Since most of these factors involve information that is likely to be hidden, a regulator will have a very hard time targeting its enforcement effort based on information that determines a firm's profit function.
Conclusions
We have examined the combined roles of bankruptcy risk and imperfect enforcement on the performance of an emissions tax. In the absence of bankruptcy risk in a population of regulated firms, emissions taxes retain their beneficial characteristics even when they are not enforced perfectly. Under reasonable conditions, an imperfectly enforced emissions tax produces an efficient allocation of individual emissions control; the aggregate level of emissions control is the same as under a perfectly enforced tax, and differences in individual violations are independent of firm-level differences. All of these characteristics disappear when some firms under an emissions tax risk bankruptcy-the allocation of emissions control is inefficient, imperfect enforcement causes higher aggregate emissions, and financially insecure firms choose higher violations. Thus, the combined effects of bankruptcy risk and imperfect enforcement produce higher expected aggregate costs of emissions control (or rather, lower aggregate expected gross profits), worse environmental quality, and more pressure on scarce enforcement resources.
Regulatory options to limit these losses are probably limited to options that reduce the risks of bankruptcy among financially insecure firms. One option, which was explored by Damania and Bulte (2006) is to provide direct subsidies to distressed firms. This option is fraught with difficulties, including the political difficulty of subsidizing polluting firms, and the moral hazard problem that would surely result because firms would have an incentive to exaggerate their risk of bankruptcy to obtain the subsidy. A more reasonable option might be to allow firms to pollute up to a certain level for free before the tax kicks in. This would reduce firms' tax payments thereby reducing the bankruptcy risk of financially insecure firms, and likely lead to more efficient outcomes. Similarly, we noted in Stranlund and Zhang (2008) that providing a greater number of free tradable emissions permits to insecure firms improved their financial health and led to a more efficient distribution of individual emissions choices.
It may also be possible to use tax rates and enforcement stringency to achieve more efficient outcomes. However, determining how this can be done requires determining the comparative statics of how changes in the tax, monitoring, and penalties affect firms' choices of emissions and violations, and these comparative statics in our model always have indeterminate signs. As others in this literature have found, changing regulatory controls and their enforcement can lead to seemingly paradoxical results; for example, increasing emissions taxes can cause financially distressed firms to increase their emissions, and reducing enforcement stringency can promote greater compliance. We should also note that these results depend on the private information of firms, including information about their profit functions and their financial health.
Thus, even though one can imagine that regulators could minimize the inefficiencies associated with bankruptcy risk with judicious choices of tax rates and enforcement strategies, the information requirements of doing so are quite severe.
∫ ∫
The latter relationships are due to our assumption that the expectation of is equal to zero. Now substitute these into equations [7] and [8] to obtain z ( ) t f e r α ′ = − and ( , ) e e t π β = , respectively.
Allocative efficiency requires that the industry's expected gross profit be maximized given the level of aggregate emissions that is induced by the emissions tax. As is well-known the necessary conditions for this maximization problem imply that the firms' marginal expected gross profits are equal. This is achieved because ( , ) e e t π β = for every firm, each firm faces the same emissions tax, and hence, ( , ) e e π β is equal for every firm. This proves part (1) of the proposition.
To prove part (2) note that a firm's choice of emissions is ( , ) e t β , the implicit solution to 
